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Abstract: It is sometimes claimed that faith is a virtue. To what extent faith is a virtue depends 
on what faith is. One construal of faith, which has been popular in both recent and historical 
work on faith, is that faith is a matter of taking oneself to have been spoken to by God and of 
trusting this purported divine testimony. In this paper, I argue that when faith is understood in 
this way, for faith to be virtuous then it must be accompanied by intellectual humility. I defend 
this view by showing how someone ought to respond to purported divine testimony if her faith 
is to be intellectually humble, and how, if it fails in this respect, it will instead be accompanied by 
the vices of either servility or arrogance.  
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Can faith be a virtue? Answers to this question vary, depending on how faith is construed, and 
whether faith is treated as a solely religious attitude, or as an attitude that can be either religious or 
non-religious. For instance, within the Christian tradition, faith is sometimes construed as a 
theological virtue, alongside love and hope. In some recent accounts, faith has been treated more 
generally in the Aristotelian sense of virtue as an excellence of character, formed gradually through 
a process of habituation. The function of faith differs on this view, with some arguing that faith 
disposes us to trust (Jeffrey (2017)), and others that faith instantiates a responsiveness to truth and 
hope (Chappell (1996)). According to other theories, faith requires committing to a risky act before 
examining further evidence, and is a virtue, on this theory, because it allows us to carry out long-
term, risky projects (Buchak (2017a)). 
In this paper, I argue that a certain kind of religious faith is only virtuous if it is 
accompanied by intellectual humility. The kind of faith in question requires trusting God, and in 
particular, trusting God’s testimony. When faith involves trusting God’s testimony, I argue, it must 
exhibit intellectual humility if such faith is to be virtuous. 
In religious contexts, both faith and humility are desirable attitudes to take towards God. 
According to St. Augustine, in his early writing Faith and the Creed, Christ’s faith exhibits a perfect 
humility that Christians are to follow in order that ‘we might reach God’ (1953, 357). In the biblical 
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Psalms, it is sometimes claimed that humility is required to be morally teachable according to 
God’s standards.1 Furthermore, in some Christian traditions, one cannot gain access to certain 
‘truths’ that God reveals unless one is humble before God, and that one must access these truths 
through faith.2  
This paper defends a distinctive way in which to bring faith and humility together by 
showing how faith must be humble if it is to be a virtue.3 To defend this view, I first develop an 
account of faith that conceives of faith as trust in God, involving trust in God’s testimony. As I 
will show, this view has received significant support from both philosophers and theologians in 
recent and historical literature. I then explore the nature of intellectual humility in terms of taking 
the appropriate response to one’s intellectual strengths and limitations. From this, we can see 
humility as a mean between the vices of intellectual servility and arrogance. Then, I show how faith 
must be accompanied by one’s intellectual humility if it is to be virtuous.4 For faith to be 
intellectually humble, one must take on the most appropriate response to the evidential situation 
one faces, taking into account one’s limitations and strengths. Where one’s faith fails to be humble, 
it may be either arrogant or servile. 
 
Faith and Trusting Testimony 
The relationship between faith and trusting God’s testimony can be found in both historical and 
recent literature. Typically, such trust is a matter of taking someone’s word for it, that is, of 
believing someone’s testimony, and can have as its object either a human or divine speaker. For 
instance, when exploring the nature of believing another person, G.E.M. Anscombe remarked that 
…At one time there was the following way of speaking: faith was distinguished as human 
and divine. Human faith was believing a mere human being; divine faith was believing 
God. (Anscombe (1979), 142) 
                                                        
1 For instance, ‘He guides the humble in what is right and teaches them his way’ (Psalm 25:9). 
2 As Anthony Kenny notes: ‘In the [Catholic] tradition in which I am speaking…Faith was a virtue 
permitting the mind access to truths which would otherwise be beyond its reach’ (1992, 47-48). 
3 For an alternative account that defends a similar claim, see Kvanvig (2018). 
4 An important movement in religious epistemology is to see religious attitudes like trust, faith and belief 
as intellectually virtuous (see the 2014 collection by Callahan and O’Connor). 
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Other recent philosophers have made similar remarks. Lara Buchak says that this kind of faith is 
‘belief on the basis of testimony: one has faith in a person if one relies on that person’s testimony 
in forming beliefs’ (2017b, 48). 
Other authors who have focussed on this kind of faith have been more committed to 
giving accounts of Christian faith, and so have tended been more attentive to believing divine 
testimony. For example, Linda Zagzebski has claimed that ‘religious faith is believing God’ (2012, 
190), and similarly, Anthony Kenny writes that religious faith is ‘belief that a proposition is true 
because God has revealed it’ (1992, 50). There are other recent authors, too, who have coalesced 
in defining religious faith as believing God, or maintaining that Christian faith requires believing 
God’s testimony,5 and this concept also has an impressive historical pedigree in both philosophy 
and theology.6 
 So, what is this kind of faith and how can we give an account of it? A useful place to begin 
is with testimony itself. Testimony is the primary linguistic means that people have of sharing their 
knowledge with other people. People tell one another propositions that they themselves (hopefully) 
take to be knowledge, offering hearers the opportunity to acquire a piece of knowledge on the 
basis of their testimony. As Elizabeth Fricker puts it: 
In a paradigm and felicitous telling, the teller rightly takes herself to know that P, and seeks 
to share her knowledge with her intended audience, whom she believes ignorant, or 
possibly ignorant, as to whether P. Telling is the proprietary linguistic means . . . of letting 
someone else know what one already knows oneself . . . [and] is a social institution for the 
spreading of knowledge, enabling it to be possessed at second-hand. (Fricker 2006, 596) 
This gives an idea of the speaker side of a testimonial exchange. But if faith is, or involves, a hearer 
trusting a speaker for her testimony, then we need to understand what the hearer’s response is to 
the testimony offered to her. 
Hearers may respond to testimony in several ways. Predominantly though, they will either 
trust or distrust what the speaker says. Believing a speaker is sufficient for trusting her, and it is only 
                                                        
5 In addition to the four cited examples, see Dougherty (2014), Lamont (2009), Michon (2017) and 
Wahlberg (2014). 
6 See Aquinas (1947, 2a2ae, 1, 1 & 2), Augustine (2010), Aulén (1954), and Owen (1892, 94-95). These 
accounts of faith are perhaps influenced by, or derived from, the biblical passage found in Genesis 15:6 
which says that ‘Abram believed the Lord, and he credited it to him as righteousness’. This act of Abram’s 
is alluded to by St. Paul in the Book of Romans (Chapter 4) as an exemplar of Christian faith. 
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through forming a belief that one may acquire knowledge from a speaker. But other responses 
may also be sufficient for trust. One may be unsure about the veracity of the testimony, or about 
the reliability of the speaker, and so cognitively suspend judgment concerning the truth of the 
testimony. Nevertheless, she may accept what the speaker says by assenting to the testimony and 
committing to act as though what the speaker has said is true (Cohen (1992)). Some accounts of 
trust have discussed how trust can be nondoxastic in this kind of way (Frost-Arnold (2014)). In 
order to leave it an open question whether hearers can trust a speaker by either believing her or 
accepting her testimony in a nondoxastic sense, I will simply say that hearers can trust speakers for 
their testimony. Of course, hearers can also distrust testimony by disbelieving it, or, perhaps, by 
refusing to act as though what one has been told is true. 
 It is the trusting response on behalf of the hearer to the speaker’s testimony that has been 
identified with faith. This is particularly evident in the quotations from Anscombe and Buchak in 
the foregoing. And quite possibly faith, in a somewhat mundane sense, can be an instance of 
trusting another person’s testimony. As Daniel Howard-Snyder claims, ‘in so far as this use of 
“faith” as believing someone involves faith at all, it involves putting one’s faith in x, trusting x, to 
tell the truth about p’ (2016, 146). And yet we might feel that religious faith requires more than one-
off instances of trusting God’s testimony. The reason why is because religious faith, particularly in 
the Christian tradition, is often taken to involve a relationship between an individual person and 
God. Someone can trust a particular person on a single piece of testimony with any stranger in the 
street with whom she has no personal relationship. What seems required for religious faith, though, 
is for one to have a general disposition to trust God, which involves a disposition to trust what 
one perceives to be God’s testimony, and that partly in virtue of such a disposition one will be in 
a trusting relationship.7 From such a disposition, one will trust God for particular instances of 
perceived testimony. 
 So, for religious faith, we require an account of faith that can make sense of this richer 
notion of a relationship of trust. A way into this issue is from recent work on the nature of faith, 
which has provided two plausible candidates for faith as an attitude with the relevant dispositions 
towards trust and reliance. First, there is propositional faith, or faith that p, as when someone has faith 
that her team will win the game, or faith that God exists. Second, there is relational faith, or faith in 
X, where X is some object, like a government, or some person, like a friend. 
                                                        
7 This is only necessary but not sufficient to be in trusting relationship, for, it is still required that God act 
in certain ways by, for instance, reciprocating the trust or communicating with the person. 
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Propositional faith is widely thought to require holding a cognitive attitude towards a 
proposition p of either belief or nondoxastic assent, such as acceptance or assumption. This can 
be characterised in terms of cognitively taking p to be true by, for instance, representing p as true, 
and being disposed to act as though p.8 In addition, propositional faith is also thought to require 
one to be in favour of the truth of p, by, for example, desiring that p, or believing p to be good or 
desirable (Audi (2008), 92; Howard-Snyder (2013), 367; Schellenberg (2005), 108). Thus construed, 
propositional faith is an attitude or mental state that a person has, concerning the truth of some 
proposition.  
Relational faith is often thought to be constituted by trust (Audi (2011), 55-56; Swinburne 
(2005), 142-147) or a disposition to rely on something (Howard-Snyder (2017), 56). For example, 
faith in one’s spouse will dispose one to trust or rely on one’s spouse. Relational faith also appears 
to require taking on a cognitive attitude toward the truth of certain propositions. For instance, 
when someone has faith in a friend to tell the truth, she accepts or believes that her friend will tell 
the truth. So, faith in X can be seen as a complex attitude in which one holds a cognitive attitude 
toward the truth of p, whilst also requiring the dispositions towards trust or reliance.  
Religious faith in the sense of trusting God and being disposed to trust God’s testimony, 
may be understood as a complex of propositional and relational faith. For instance, as when a 
person S has faith that God is trustworthy and what God tells S is true, and when S has faith in 
God to be trustworthy and to speak truly. Such a complex of faith attitudes will dispose a person 
in various ways to trust God, including to trust God for his testimony, to rely on it in thought and 
decision-making, and to act as though the perceived testimony is true.9  
Note that there is a distinction here between attitudes with dispositions and actions 
exhibiting those dispositions. This can be put in terms of having faith in God and putting faith in 
God. Consider this in relation to faith in God’s testimony. Someone can have faith in God to tell 
the truth in virtue of a disposition to rely on God’s testimony. But she can also put faith in God’s 
testimony by trusting what she perceives God to have said. Having faith in X provides one with a 
complex mental judgment involving a psychological disposition to trust or rely on X. Even though 
                                                        
8 Whether propositional faith requires belief that p, or the weaker condition of a ‘positive cognitive attitude’ 
toward p, is currently a matter of debate. It concerns similar issues to the earlier mentioned debate around 
nondoxasticism about trust. See Malcolm and Scott (2017) for an overview and critique of the idea that 
propositional faith can be nondoxastic. 
9 It is widely held that, in general, faith motivates an agent to action (e.g. Bishop 2007, 115-6; Howard-
Snyder 2017, 56-7; Schellenberg 2005, 127-66; Swinburne 2001, 211). 
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this state motivates someone to action, it is not itself an action. But putting faith in X is to exhibit 
the dispositions given by one’s faith, and when one’s faith concerns the reliability of someone as 
a speaker, then these dispositions are exhibited by trusting what the person says. This can be done 
through belief, acceptance, and the commitment to act as though the testimony is true. 
 When someone’s faith in another is exhibited through action – when she puts her faith in 
someone – then we can say that she performs an act of faith in the sense that she acts on her faith. 
When she acts on her faith, she performs the actions that she is disposed toward in virtue of her 
faith. Such actions are exhibitions of her faith in much the same way as with other kinds of traits 
or attitudes. For instance, an intellectually generous researcher will be disposed to share her 
findings as widely as possible, both to academics and members of the public (cf. Roberts and 
Wood (2007), 286-304). When she performs these actions, we can say that she performs acts of 
intellectual generosity. An intellectually closed-minded student will be disposed to confirmation 
bias, and hence to only look for evidence that supports his existing views. When he performs these 
actions, we can say that he performs acts of intellectual closed-mindedness. 
 Of course, any of these actions can be performed without having the corresponding trait 
or attitude. Someone can share research findings beyond academia without being intellectually 
generous, and someone can search only for confirmatory evidence for a belief without being 
intellectually close-minded. And similar claims can be made about faith. Someone could perform 
an act of faith without having faith in X, or faith that p. But since we’re interested in a deep kind 
of relational faith that disposes someone to trust God – a kind required by religious, and 
particularly Christian faith – then I’m focussing on acts of faith in the sense that they express or 
exhibit a person’s existing faith, rather than acts distinct from it. 
 We can see the distinction between faith and acts exhibiting one’s faith in both general and 
religious cases. For instance, when Jane has faith that her friend will pick her up from the airport 
on time, she is disposed to rely on her friend in this respect, and can act in this faith by relying on 
her to collect her rather than calling a taxi. When Mark has faith in the Grand Canyon Skywalk to 
hold his weight, he is disposed to rely on it in this respect, and he can act in his faith by walking 
out onto it. And when Kate has faith in God to speak truly, and faith that God is a reliable and 
credible testifier, then she is disposed to defer to, trust, and rely on what she takes to be God’s 
testimony. Kate can then perform an act of faith that expresses or exhibits her faith in God in 
these respects by trusting the purported testimony, deferring to it, committing to live as though it 
is true, etc. 
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 Now, although the model of faith discussed thus far began with a comparison between 
trusting human testimony and trusting God’s testimony, there is an important disanalogy between 
the two that moves us towards a distinctive account of religious faith. For, whilst there is generally 
no problem identifying a speaker in typical cases of human testimony, it is not straightforward 
identifying a purported instance of God’s testimony as God’s testimony. This is generally the case 
because testimony from human speakers comes to us immediately and directly: speakers just assert 
to us, and we either trust or don’t trust them. Divine testimony, however, if indeed it is spoken, 
typically comes to us indirectly, mediated via various sources, including scripture, prophets, 
sermons, tradition, and perhaps even major life events or advice from friends. There is a separate 
task for the believer of divine testimony, over the believer in human testimony, namely, to 
adjudicate whether a piece of purported divine testimony is indeed God’s testimony. Subsequent 
to that, a person may simply believe the testimony itself, as with general cases of testimony. 
 Observation of this disanalogy prompts an account of religious faith on three levels. First, 
one trusts God in the sense described earlier in this section by having faith in God in various 
respects, and faith that relevant propositions concerning God are the case. Second, such trust will 
dispose someone to trust God has spoken:  
(TGS): a person S trusts that some object or event (scripture, sermon, etc.) is an instance of 
God’s testimony.  
Someone with religious faith will be disposed in this way because she will have adopted a religious 
worldview in which there is a God who ‘speaks’ by various means, and will trust this God to speak 
truly. Hence, she will exhibit these dispositions by trusting God has spoken (TGS). But third, she 
will also be disposed to trust God’s testimony:  
(TGT): a person S trusts that the purported testimony from God is true.  
That is, once one believes God has told her something, she will also have the disposition to trust 
what she takes herself to have been told. And trusting God has spoken (TGS) and trusting this 
purported divine testimony (TGT), will be to perform acts of one’s faith – actions which exhibit 
one’s religious faith in God. Someone who has faith in this three-tiered sense I will say has faith as 
trusting God (FTG). 
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From a theistic perspective, then, we can see faith as someone taking herself to be ‘hearing’ 
and trusting God’s testimony, where God is the ‘speaker’ of the testimony.10 However, FTG does 
not specify what the source of the mediated testimony must be: the actual mode of the purported 
divine testimony can vary to a large extent (e.g. scripture, prophets, visions, the Holy Spirit, quasi-
perceptual sensus divinitatis (Plantinga (2000)) etc.). What it therefore is for God to perform acts of 
testimony can manifest in various ways, and it is up to the individual account to fill in the details. 
However, what I have to say about intellectual humility will not be affected by the way one 
construes what it is for God to speak, nor what it is to hear from God.  
Nevertheless, it may be insisted that FTG requires one to ‘go beyond the evidence’ in some 
sense (see Malcolm forthcoming). The reason for this is because at the stage of TGS, it is unlikely 
that anyone could acquire the relevant evidence to make such a move epistemically justifiable. 
Sometimes this idea is built into the very concept of faith itself, albeit not always in contexts of 
theistic faith. For instance, it has been argued that faith involves, implies or even requires:  
‘a weak epistemic position vis-à-vis the proposition in question’ (Alston (1996), 12);  
a person to ‘not take her evidence on its own to support her being certain that’ p (Buchak 
(2014), 53);  
‘an active venture in practical commitment to the truth of faith-propositions that the believer 
correctly recognizes not to be adequately supported by his or her evidence’ (Bishop (2007), 
106); or  
that ‘nothing is faith unless it is evidentially sub-optimal’ (Howard-Snyder (2013), 370). 
I won’t take a stand on which of these accounts is correct. But I accept, first, that the 
concept of propositional faith does imply that one is in non-ideal epistemic circumstances, 
although these circumstances do not need to require that one lacks epistemic justification.11 And 
second, in the sense described here, faith will likely require one to trust that God has spoken 
without being in ideal epistemic circumstances for believing that God has spoken. Nevertheless, 
trusting in this way could yet be satisfied through nondoxastic acceptance rather than belief if one 
is not justified in believing God has spoken. This issue, and related concerns surrounding one’s 
                                                        
10 The idea that faith is the ‘hearing’ of revelation can be seen in many theological works, including the 3rd 
Century theologian Clement of Alexandria, who remarks, poetically and metaphorically, that ‘faith is the 
ear of the soul’ (1971, 5.1). 
11 One could, for instance, be permitted but not required to believe p. 
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appropriate levels of confidence, are revisited in later sections. But with this account of faith (FTG) 
in hand, I want to move now to consider intellectual humility, and how it must accompany 
someone’s faith if her FTG is to be virtuous.  
 
Intellectual Humility, Servility and Arrogance 
Recent work on intellectual humility has focussed on the role of humility in giving someone a 
proper appreciation of both her intellectual strengths and weaknesses. For instance, according to 
Kidd (2015, 54), ‘humility is a virtue for the management of confidence’, and in particular, he 
focusses on the role of humility in regulating someone’s proper confidence and recognition of her 
intellectual capacities. Take, for example, a student coming to the end of her studies at high school, 
and deciding what further education she would like to pursue. If she has virtuous intellectual 
humility, she will have the correct level of confidence in her capacities with respect to e.g. 
processing numbers, reading and writing, arguing and debating, computers and programming, 
compassion and tolerance, timekeeping, manual labouring, and other cognitive, emotional and 
physical capacities. This will give her the dispositions needed to wisely select the best future study 
for her, and the most appropriate career-path given her intellectual abilities. If she has excellent 
intellectual capability with reading and writing, but limited abilities with mathematics, then, her 
intellectual humility will give her the appropriate level of confidence in these capacities. 
 Remarks along a similar line can be found in two further accounts (Whitcomb et al. 2017; 
Tanesini 2018), which understand intellectual humility as the acknowledgement of one’s 
intellectual limitations, being properly attentive to them, and working them appropriately into 
one’s practical reasoning. According to Whitcomb et al., intellectual limitations include 
…gaps in knowledge (e.g. ignorance of current affairs), cognitive mistakes (e.g. forgetting 
an appointment), unreliable processes (e.g. bad vision or memory), deficits in learnable 
skills (e.g. being bad at math), intellectual character flaws (e.g. a tendency to draw hasty 
inferences), and much more besides. (Whitcomb et al. 2017, 516). 
Whitcomb et al. then go on to define intellectual humility as ‘having the right stance toward one’s 
intellectual limitations’ where this is a matter of being ‘appropriately attentive to them and to own 
them’ (516). The colloquial expression of ‘owning’ something is a matter of embracing or 
endorsing that thing. Suppose, for instance, that someone has been recently promoted in her job 
and is intimidated by the prospect of the added responsibility. One could ‘own’ the new job role 
by acting as though one feels ready to take it on, talking confidently about it, making assertive 
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decisions with one’s new authority, etc. In this way, the person ‘owns’ the new job by embracing 
and endorsing it.  
Consider the same concept when someone ‘owns’ an intellectual limitation. Suppose 
someone has poor eyesight but spends a fair amount of time driving. This person’s intellectual 
limitations include an unreliable cognitive process – poor eyesight. What does it mean for someone 
to be ‘appropriately attentive’ to the fact of one’s poor eyesight, and to ‘own’ it? Whitcomb et al. 
identify four characteristic dispositions that attentiveness and owning will yield concerning one’s 
intellectual limitations: 
(1) [to] believe that one has them; and to believe that their negative outcomes are due to 
them; (2) to admit or acknowledge them; (3) to care about them and take them seriously; 
and (4) to feel regret or dismay, but not hostility, about them. (Whitcomb et al. 2017, 519) 
For our driver with poor eyesight, then, he will be disposed to (1) believe he has poor eyesight and 
believe that this can lead to poor or dangerous driving; (2) admit that he has poor eyesight; (3) care 
that he has poor eyesight and take this seriously; and (4) feel dismay but not hostility towards his 
poor eyesight. These dispositions will manifest themselves in certain behaviours for the driver. He 
will be careful to make sure he always wears his glasses when driving, and to drive slowly to offset 
any potential risks caused by his condition. He will also tell others about his eyesight when asked, 
or when required to admit that he has the condition, for instance, by declaring it on his driver’s 
licence. This is what it would mean to be attentive to, and to ‘own’ one’s poor eyesight, and hence 
to exhibit intellectual humility concerning it.  
 It should be noted that both the accounts by Kidd and Whitcomb et al. (as well as 
Tanesini), focus on deficits in one’s own intellectual limitations. However, we could broaden this 
to encompass deficits in humans generally. All humans have an extremely limited epistemic vantage 
point, and lack the ability to know of all of the different experiences and points of view of other 
humans in other cultures at different times in history. Having intellectual humility requires taking 
these more general limitations into account, as well as one’s own particular limitations. These 
general limitations are particularly relevant at points for religious epistemology. 
 With this in mind, the way that someone is required to form her beliefs in light of 
intellectual humility depends on the evidence at her disposal, and the proper conclusions she draws 
concerning her intellectual strengths and limitations. For instance, if someone has poor 
navigational abilities, humility requires that she believe she has poor navigational abilities, but if 
they are excellent, then she is required by humility to believe they are excellent. These dispositions 
would follow on each of the accounts outlined thus far. 
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Another clear example of how intellectual humility regulates our beliefs is in the social 
sphere, with testimony providing the most obvious example. Whitcomb et al. argue that intellectual 
humility ‘increases a person’s propensity to defer to others who don’t have her intellectual 
limitations’ (522). Although such a propensity will require one to believe someone else who lacks 
one’s own limitations, it will not require this for all cases. For instance, if I know I have poor 
knowledge of current affairs and speak to a friend about current affairs who I know is highly 
knowledgeable about them, then my intellectual humility will give me a propensity to defer to her 
testimony. And if I do defer to it, then that is an act exhibiting my humility. But suppose we are 
talking about a particular issue, say, the sale of arms from western countries to Saudi Arabia. This 
is an issue I know a little about having watched a reliable documentary on it. She tells me something 
on this issue that I disagree with, but I have good reason to suspect that she is just speculating and 
lacks any credible evidence to back up her claims. Well, in this case it is such that I needn’t defer 
to her even given my general limitations in the area of public affairs. It is entirely proper of me to 
resist deference to her consistently with a correct appreciation of my confidence in my intellectual 
capacities, and whilst acknowledging and ‘owning’ my intellectual limitations. This is because I 
have superior epistemic capacity in this case, and have reasons for doubting the veracity of her 
testimony. 
 This example also provides us with a way of seeing how humility as a virtue is a mean 
between the vices of servility and arrogance. For, if I had no reason to doubt the trustworthiness 
of my friend, nor the veracity of her testimony, and had no knowledge of the issue for myself, 
then humility would require me to defer to her. But if I simply took myself to have superior 
knowledge of political affairs (which I lack) and refused to defer to her testimony on these grounds, 
then this would indicate that I lack humility, and instead have intellectual arrogance, at least with 
respect to this issue in political affairs. This would particularly be the case if I systematically failed 
to appreciate my limitations and so held onto beliefs about political matters when I should have 
let go of them in the face of people with greater knowledge than myself. This idea is captured in 
the account by Whitcomb et al. who say that ‘the paradigmatically arrogant person is often 
oblivious to his limitations; they don’t show up on his radar’ (516). When I don’t see my own 
limitations, particularly with respect to the strengths of others, then I will tend towards arrogance 
rather than humility. 
 Just as we can use the deficit of attentiveness to limitations to understand intellectual 
arrogance, we can see the over-attentiveness to limitations as a way of understanding intellectual 
servility. The arrogant person is hardly aware of her own intellectual limitations, but ‘[t]he 
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paradigmatically servile person…hardly sees anything else; his radar is perpetually peppered with 
his limitations’ (Whitcomb et al., 517). With servility, someone would be overly keen to defer to 
the testimony of others, even those who have significant intellectual limitations beyond our own. 
So, suppose I am told things concerning the sale of weapons to Saudi Arabia by someone who I 
judge correctly to lack knowledge on the subject when I myself have knowledge on the subject. 
Well, if I defer to the speaker’s testimony because I think to myself, ‘I must be wrong about my 
views because I’m too stupid to understand public affairs’, then this indicates servility, rather than 
humility: I am servile to my limitations. In this case, humility would require that I give proper 
appreciation to my strengths and limitations, rather than over-appreciation to my limitations, and 
resist deference to my friend’s testimony. 
 With this picture of the nature of intellectual humility, servility and arrogance in hand, we 
are in a position to determine what humility would require of someone who has faith in the sense 
of FTG. As we’ll see, FTG must be accompanied by humility if it is to be virtuous. 
 
Humble, Servile and Arrogant Faith 
Given what we have said about intellectual humility, one might assume that the humble response 
to God’s testimony is simply to trust it. After all, on a traditional theistic view, God is all knowing 
and cannot lie, whereas humans are substantially cognitively limited in ways that God is not. But 
this view faces a problem, which is evident in the account of faith developed earlier: trusting God’s 
testimony (TGT) requires one to first trust that God has spoken (TGS). It seems reasonable that 
trusting God’s testimony is required by humility when one has clear evidence that God has spoken, 
but it’s not so clear what humility requires concerning TGS. John Lamont phrases the problem in 
this way: 
[T]estimony gives knowledge when the speaker who is believed is honest and 
knowledgeable. In the case of God, there is no difficulty about the speaker’s honesty and 
knowledge, since these are possessed necessarily. Instead, the difficulty lies in identifying 
divine speaking. In most of the Christian tradition this speaking is seen as being done by 
human instruments…and as occurring at least in the scriptures, and for many Christians 
in the teaching of the Church as well. (Lamont (2009), 115) 
Lamont proposes that the reason for the difficulty in identifying divine speaking is the means of 
the speaking. If we take God to speak by appropriating various communicative acts, including 
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sermons, written scripture and songs, then we must determine whether a purported piece of divine 
speaking is in fact divine speaking in a way we do not with human speaking. 
Now, suppose we have someone called Sarah who has faith in the sense of FTG. Sarah 
has recently begun engaging with the Christian faith, forming an attitude of trust towards God. 
This has been cultivated within a Christian community of others who also trust God, and where 
it is common to be reliant on God by, for instance, petitioning God in prayer, committing to live 
as though God’s plan for salvation is true, and basing one’s decisions on Christian ethical values. 
During her engagement with Christianity, Sarah has been attending Christian church services 
where she sings hymns, hears sermons and reads scripture. Sarah has had the impression that God 
has been speaking to her through these religious activities. Amongst the things she takes God to 
have told her are that he is a loving God, that she will continue to live spiritually after her bodily 
death, and that God was literally born into human history in the life of Jesus Christ. These are not 
propositions that Sarah had previously accepted, endorsed or believed. However, she has 
responded to this perceived divine revelation by acting on the supposition that their source is 
God’s own speech to her, trusting God for this testimony, and committing herself to living as 
though such propositions are true.  
Does Sarah’s response exhibit humility? Or does it exhibit servility or arrogance? This 
depends on two factors:  
(1) the evidence E she has for the proposition p that God has testified to her; and  
(2) the cognitive attitude Sarah forms concerning p given E.  
Suppose that, concerning (1), her evidence for God speaking or testifying to her is limited and not 
sufficient to warrant belief. She therefore has a limitation: a gap in her evidence required for 
justified belief or knowledge. Now, concerning (2), suppose that Sarah believes that God has spoken 
to her, and that her confidence in this belief is high such that she takes it to constitute knowledge 
– she is confident that she knows that God has spoken to her. Well, in this kind of case, we could 
then charge Sarah with either intellectual arrogance or servility, depending on what her reasons are 
for believing as she does. Let’s see why. 
Suppose that Sarah takes herself to have greater epistemic abilities than she does have for 
discerning whether or not God is speaking to her. She might take herself to hear a clear voice from 
God when she prays, which in fact she does not hear. In fact, this belief is formed due simply to 
a desire to hear God’s voice, and so she has convinced herself that she can hear him. What’s 
evident is that she now has another limitation: an unreliable cognitive process. So, Sarah has two 
important epistemic limitations: insufficient evidence and an unreliable belief-forming mechanism. 
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Now, in this case she can be accused of intellectual arrogance because she is being under-attentive to 
her limitations (on Whitcomb et al’s account; c.f. Tanesini 2018) and overly confident with respect to 
her intellectual capacities (on Kidd’s account). And because of this, Sarah’s response to what she 
perceives to be God’s testimony is accompanied by arrogance – she is arrogant with respect to her 
limitations – and hence her FTG is a vice. 
Consider Sarah’s situation under a different response. Suppose that Sarah is initially unsure 
about whether God has spoken to her. She recognises, correctly, that she has a limited epistemic 
vantage point and is a new Christian and has new intuitions. Nevertheless, she also acknowledges, 
also correctly, that she has perfectly good judgment of whether to trust her senses, and so initially 
resists believing that God has spoken to her. However, because of the pressures of being in a new 
religious environment where most people claim to hear from God, she begins to assume that her 
epistemic limitations – being a new Christian and having a limited vantage point – must be 
preventing her from hearing from God. She thinks to herself, ‘I must have this wrong. I am just a 
limited human being and I should just believe that God is speaking to me’. Now, certainly Sarah 
has limitations. But here she is being over-attentive to them, and under confident with respect to her 
intellectual strengths. She actually possesses the correct level of discernment, but has ceased to be 
disposed to follow it in this religious context. So, in this case, Sarah’s response to what she 
perceives to be God’s testimony is accompanied by servility – she is being servile to her limitations 
– and hence her FTG is a vice. 
So, we have seen where Sarah’s faith can be arrogant or servile. But despite this, it can also 
be humble. However, in order to see this, we must change the setup of the example. Note that in 
the above example, her response exhibits an intellectual vice because, with respect to the 
proposition that God has testified to her, Sarah (1) lacks evidence to warrant belief, but (2) believes 
anyway, and even presumes her belief to constitute knowledge. We can change the example by, 
first, assuming that Sarah has evidence sufficient to warrant belief and believes, or lacks evidence 
sufficient to believe, but does not believe. Let’s consider these options in order. 
It might be assumed that, given our intellectual limitations – our limited epistemic vantage 
point, inability to discern human from divine testimony, etc. – it is not possible for us to have 
evidence sufficient to justify the belief that God has spoken. But we could deny this. Even John 
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Locke, who holds a similar view of faith to FTG,12 and who was highly sceptical of people claiming 
to have received divine revelation, thought that it is possible to justify one’s belief that one has 
been spoken to by God. Locke’s view on the matter was that confirmation of the revelation by 
clear miracles would be sufficient to justify belief that the purported revelation was genuine (see 
Ch XIX, §15). This will be the case regardless of the intellectual limitations of the recipient of the 
revelation. The example Locke uses is Moses, who was spoken to by God through a burning bush, 
and whose staff repeatedly turned into a serpent. Perhaps Moses has clear evidence that he was 
spoken to by God via clear miracles. 
 In a modern context, Wolterstorff (1995, 261-80) considers some instances in which 
people can be entitled to believe that God has spoken to them through confirmation of the 
experiences of others. In particular, where one person is considering whether God has spoken to 
her on a particular matter, and another person tells her, without knowing her situation, that God 
has spoken to her about the very same thing. Under some conditions, such interactions could 
plausibly constitute evidence sufficient to permit belief that God has spoken. 
These responses from Locke and Wolterstorff face two problems. First, in line with some 
of the views about faith mentioned earlier, if Sarah has clear evidence that God has spoken to her 
then she wouldn’t need faith that he has, and hence Sarah wouldn’t exhibit FTG, which is the main 
concern of this paper. This point is important, and I want to offer two possible ways of responding 
to it.  
First, we could say that even if one can be justified in believing God has spoken, this 
doesn’t imply that the person can have clear evidence or certainty that he has, and hence her 
evidence would be sub-optimal, even if it isn’t sub-par. Her belief that God has spoken may still 
require some small faith step, even if this is minimal, particularly given how amazing it would be 
that God has spoken to her. Believing this will still require some measure of faith, even if only a 
small amount. Moreover, recall that in the earlier iteration, Sarah not only believes, but has an 
extremely high level of confidence that her belief is justified and true – so high that she takes 
herself to have knowledge. But in the case we have been considering, she could have just enough 
evidence to permit belief, and hence be rational, but not have enough evidence to require belief, 
and hence to be fully rational. Given this, her confidence in her belief could be far more tentative. 
                                                        
12 Locke defines faith as ‘the assent to any proposition, not thus made out by the deductions of reason, but 
upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication. This 
way of discovering truths to men, we call revelation.’ (Locke 1924, Bk IV, Ch XVIII, §2). 
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She could be unsure about whether her belief is justified and true, and hence be disposed to caution 
when it comes to acting on the basis that it is true. In this instance, Sarah hardly takes her evidence 
to be clear or conclusive. There is plenty of room here for being in a weak epistemic position 
(Alston 1996, 12), not taking her evidence to support certainty (Buchak 2014, 53), faith-venturing 
inadequately supported by her evidence (Bishop 2007, 106), and faith being sub-optimal (Howard-
Snyder 2013, 370). 
A second (and possibly complementary) way of addressing this issue is by claiming that 
her belief is fully justified in relation to some contexts but not others, and hence her faith is in a 
weak epistemic position with respect to some contexts but not all. Note that it could be reasonable 
for Sarah to believe certain propositions given her Christian context. Suppose she believes that 
God has told her that he is Triune. We might suppose that in Sarah’s community, there is 
widespread consensus that God is Triune, and that this belief is adopted and endorsed amongst 
all of the other members of her religious community. So, she could be warranted in believing this 
proposition, partly because of the consensus in her community that it is true, but only in relation 
to her Christian context: it is the norm to believe it. Outside of that context her belief may not be 
warranted. And hence, what we could propose is that Sarah’s faith ‘goes beyond the evidence’ in 
some way with respect to the wider context but not with respect to her Christian context. 
Now, even if one, or perhaps both, of these responses is tenable, a second problem now 
arises that human experiences of miracles and divine interaction are notoriously controversial. 
After all, even occasions where one person feels that her circumstances lend strong evidence to 
the claim that God has testified to her, there are still issues concerning interpretation of the 
‘evidence’, religious disagreement from other traditions, and biases and partialities to take into 
account. Nevertheless, we should permit that in principle people can have the experiences required 
to justify their belief that God has spoken, even if such experiences seem rare or unlikely. 
So, suppose that, somehow, Sarah has evidence sufficient to warrant belief that God has 
spoken to her – albeit weak and only justifying belief partially – and she believes accordingly. 
Under these circumstances, she can exhibit intellectual humility. Sarah can acknowledge her 
limitations, her gaps in knowledge, her limited time spent as a Christian. She can even fairly and 
correctly identify that she has epistemic strengths that lead her to perhaps rightly believe that 
hearing God speaking is unlikely or rare. And yet when presented with good evidence that God 
has spoken, and without being overly attentive to her limitations or under attentive to her 
strengths, Sarah can form the belief that God has spoken. Intellectual humility certainly permits 
this belief, if not requires it, depending on the strength of the evidence.  
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But she may also be required by humility to have the appropriate level of confidence in 
her belief. She must acknowledge her limitations, including the limitations of her evidence base, 
and her confidence in her belief vis-à-vis knowledge must be measured appropriately. What seems 
most consistent with humility is that she ought to hold her belief tentatively, and not presume to 
know that God has spoken to her. This might dispose her to be particularly sensitive to new 
evidence disconfirming her belief, and to require clearer evidence to support the belief. She might 
also be disposed toward caution with respect to acting as though it is true, and in telling others 
that God has spoken to her, particularly with respect to norms of assertion. 
When Sarah’s response to what she perceives to be God’s testimony is as described here, 
her FTG is accompanied by humility. She is being humble concerning to her strengths and 
limitations, reflected in the tentativeness of her belief that God has spoken. Given this, her faith 
can be construed as a virtue, provided it is not subject to other vicious limitations or shortfalls. 
Although this kind of situation is possible in principle, it may be more likely that Sarah 
lacks evidence sufficient to warrant belief that God has spoken. But we might imagine that, rather 
than believing that God has spoken, as she did when exhibiting arrogance or servility, that Sarah 
does not believe that God has spoken. So, suppose that Sarah has the impression that God is 
speaking to her through various appropriated means. However, it’s not clear to her that he is in 
fact speaking. She has a fair and reasonable awareness of her limitations. For instance, she is new 
to this experience and is still trying to discern what to make of it. She appreciates that she has a 
limited set of experiences and a restricted epistemic vantage point. But part of this assessment of 
her limitations is also the recognition that she may seriously want to feel that God is speaking to 
her, and so she needs to temper her confidence with respect to believing that he has, or else she 
could end up with false or delusory beliefs. She also has an awareness of her intellectual strengths 
– she has a good sense of her abilities to discern whether someone is trustworthy, and plenty of 
life experience, which instructs her on the biases and interests of others. She understands that 
religious people can often have strong partialities, and is wary of not becoming someone who lacks 
proper discernment. 
So, rather than coming to belief that God has spoken, Sarah suspends judgment 
concerning this proposition. Moreover, she holds her levels of confidence fairly low, and is 
disposed to require strong evidence before coming to believe that God has spoken to her. 
Nevertheless, she both hopes and accepts that he has spoken to her. Since she is tentative about the 
truth of God speaking to her, such hope and acceptance disposes her to act in measured ways. For 
instance, by praying to God when she feels that he is communicating to her, doing good actions 
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that may have been commanded by God, such as showing love to her work colleagues, and 
committing herself to live as though Christ died for her, which she takes God to have told her. 
She wouldn’t be disposed to, for instance, change her life completely by quitting her job because 
she simply has an impression of God telling her to do this. Her acceptance is cautious because her 
levels of confidence are measured and restrained.  
Sarah’s response appears to be paradigmatically humble. She doesn’t rush off, believing 
and having full confidence because she takes herself to have excellent abilities in discerning God’s 
voice, which she lacks, as the arrogant person would. Nor is she overly sensitive to her limitations, 
and so believes God has spoken because she thinks to herself that she must have her judgments 
wrong, when she doesn’t, as the servile person would. Her response exhibits humility because she 
‘owns’ her limitations in a way that appreciates that she has them, and so should be open to God 
speaking to her. But she is also properly confident with respect to her strengths, and so measures 
her cognitive response to the possibility of God speaking by resisting outright belief, and has a 
restrained level of confidence. In such circumstances, FTG is accompanied by intellectual humility 
and hence can be a virtue. 
Now, we might agree that this response is one of humility, but is it also one of faith? 
Doesn’t faith require Sarah to believe, rather than merely hope or accept, that God has spoken? 
Well, as was discussed earlier, there is widespread (though not universal) support for the view that 
faith does not require belief, and hence, when Sarah trusts that God has spoken (TGS), she could 
simply act on the supposition that God has spoken. In terms of cognitive attitudes, this can be satisfied 
by either belief or acceptance, and so Sarah’s response, when she has sufficient evidence, can be 
one of belief, and when she lacks it, it can be one of acceptance. But of course, in order for her 
response to be one of faith in the sense of FTG, Sarah must also trust what she takes God to have 
said to her. Again, this can be a nondoxastic response, but will also involve relying on God in 
certain ways, as Sarah does when, for instance, she commits to living as though the Christian 
narrative of salvation is true.  
In summary, in order that Sarah’s FTG be virtuous, it must be accompanied by intellectual 
humility. This requires her to make the appropriate cognitive and epistemic response to putative 
divine testimony, which is determined by both Sarah’s intellectual strengths and limitations, and 
the evidence available to her concerning whether or not God is speaking to her. At times, belief 
and high levels of confidence may be consistent with an intellectually humble response, whilst in 
others, a nondoxastic response may be the intellectually humble attitude to take. When she fails to 
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take the appropriately humble response, her faith can be accompanied by the vices of servility or 
arrogance. 
 
Conclusion 
I have argued that faith, in the rich sense of being disposed to trust God and to act in this faith by 
trusting what one perceives to be God’s testimony, must be accompanied by intellectual humility 
if it is to be virtuous. Otherwise, such faith could be intellectually servile or arrogant. But there 
may be other conditions required for such faith to be virtuous. For instance, that it is proper to 
rely on God, or that God must actually exist in order that faith in him be a virtue. But at the least, 
in order that faith as trusting God be virtuous, it must be accompanied by intellectual humility.13 
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